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MERGERS IN DOMESTIC AVIATION: THE ROLE
OF COMPETITION
HENRY E. FOLEY* AND LAURENCE S. FORDHAM**
INTRODUCTION
The subject of air carrier unifications is one of many discussed by
Carl J. Fulda, Professor of Law at Ohio State University, in his recent
book.' Professor Fulda provides a broad, general.work on the trans-
portation field of considerable value to the transportation specialist
as well as to the general practitioner. He surveys the various branches
of the transportation industry—the railroads, motor and water car-
riers, commercial airlines and freight forwarders—discussing gov-
ernment regulation of each and their common problems with regard
to regulation, rate agreements, inter-modal competition and the court-
administrative agency relationship. His broad theme is the interplay
between the principle of competition embodied in the antitrust laws
and the principle of regulatory restraints on competition created by
the federal transportation statutes and applied by the agencies ad-
ministering those statutes.
Professor Fulda clearly favors vigorous competition. He criticizes
Congress for its failure to articulate strongly that such competition
should be the dominant influence in administrative decisions in the
transportation field. He endorses Congressman Emanuel Celler's pro-
posal that Congress enact a declaration, applicable to all transporta-
tion, to the effect that "the principles of free enterprise embodied in the
antitrust laws" shall be maintained "to the maximum extent prac-
ticable." 2 In short, competition would clearly be the norm and devia-
tions from it would have to be justified by a strong showing of other
public interest factors.'
Although Professor Fulda, as of the time of his writing, feels that
the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board")
has been more true to the principle of competition in the airline sector
than has the Interstate Commerce Commission in other sectors of the
transportation industry, he has mixed feelings about the Board's
regulation of what he calls airline "unifications," by merger, consolida-
tion, acquisition of assets or other similar means.' Professor Fulda
* A.B. 1922, Boston College; LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1926, Harvard Law School;
Senior Partner, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, Boston. Foley, Hoag & Eliot is Counsel for North-
east Airlines, Inc.
• 	 ** B.S. 1951, University of Illinois; LL B 1954, Harvard Law School; Partner,
Foley, Hoag & Eliot, Boston.
Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries: Transportation (1961).
2 Id. at 455.
a Ibid.
4 Id. at 225 et seq.
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lauds the Board for its approvals of unifications of the small trunk-
lines, all of which "made creditable contributions to solidifying the
remaining lines and•improving their route pattern."' These decisions,
he reasons, further "the policy of strengthening the smaller trunks"
and they "augment competition" rather than diminish it"
On the other hand, Professor Fulda lauds the Board for dis-
approving two proposed acquisitions by large trunkline carriers be-
cause of their competitive significance, namely, the proposed United-
Western and American-Mid-Continent integrations, and he is critical
of the decisions of the Board approving two other proposed acquisi-
tions by large trunklines, namely, the Eastern-Colonial and United-
Capital mergers.' Because these four decisions of the Board are so
important in illuminating the line between permisSible and imper-
missible unifications of air carriers, they are examined in some detail
later in this comment.
THE GOVERNING STATUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO COMPETITION
Unifications of air carriers are unlawful unless they are approved
by the Board.' If approved, they are exempt from the antitrust laws.'
The governing statute requires that the Board approve proposed unifi-
cations of air carriers "upon such terms and conditions as it shall find
to be just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may pre-
scribe" unless, upon application for approval, it finds after hearing
that a proposed unification "will not be consistent with the public
interest" or "would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and
thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier . . . ."'"
The elements of the "public interest" criterion are contained in
Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act, which provides in part that:
[The Board shall consider . . . as being in the public in-
terest, and in accordance with the public convenience and
necessity:
. . . .
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air-transportation system properly
5 Id. at 230. The four largest domestic trunklines—United, American, TWA and
Eastern—are known in the industry as the "Big Four." The remaining trunklines are
Braniff, Continental, Delta, National, Northeast, Northwest and Western.
6 Id. at 230-31.
7 Id. at 226-29.
8 Federal Aviation Act § 408(a)(1), 72 Stat. 767 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1)
(1958).
9 Federal Aviation Act § 414, 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958).
10 Federal Aviation Act § 408(b), 74 Stat. 901 (1960), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (Stipp
IV, 1959-62).
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adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the na-
tional defense . . . ."
The declaration that competition shall prevail "to the extent
necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation
system" is unique among federal transportation statutes and it reflects
the view of Congress that "competition" has a singular importance
in air transportation.
Congress' intent to prohibit unifications of air carriers which
would result in monopoly and thereby restrain competition is empha-
sized by the legislative history of this proviso, which further shows
the importance of competition to Congress." Under the Air Mail Act
of 1934, it was unlawful for air mail contractors competing on parallel
routes to merge or enter into any agreement that might result in
common control or ownership. A bill introduced in 1937 to provide,
for the first time, regulation of civil aeronautics authorized approval
of mergers "consistent with the public interest." The Postmaster
General opposed this proposal, insisting that repeal of the anti-merger
provision of the 1934 Act would lead to monopoly, particularly in view
of the requirement in the bill that there be specific authorization to
engage in air transportation before entry was permissible. The bill
as reported prohibited unifications of air carriers which,
would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and there-
by unduly restrain competition or unreasonably jeopardize
another air carrier not a party to the consolidation, merger,
purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control
so proposed . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)"
Controversy continued, however, as to the adequacy of the safeguards
against monopoly. In accordance with a proposal made by Senator
Borah, there were deleted the words "unduly" from "unduly restrain
competition" and "unreasonably" from "unreasonably jeopardize
another carrier." The nub of Senator Borah's argument was that:
When we say to the commission that these lines shall not
do a thing "unduly" or "unreasonably," it is very different
from saying that they shall not do it. It gives too much room
for unlimited construction.
He recognized that the language he sought to have deleted,
has been adopted from the language used by the Supreme
11 Federal Aviation Act § 102, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
12 The legislative history is reviewed at some length in Comment, Merger, and
Monopoly in Domestic Aviation, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 851, 854-62 (1962).
13 5.2, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 312(a)(1), as reported, Senate Calendar No. 702,
June 7, 1937.
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Court in the monopoly cases; but I do not think it is a prin-
ciple which we ought to foster and encourage."
MEANING OF THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PROVISO
The decisions of the Board offer only meager guidance as to the
meaning of the anti-monopoly proviso. The relevant markets have
been merely defined broadly as: "air transportation, or any phase
thereof, in any territory or section of the country."" Despite lack
of guidance by the Board, it is generally accepted that city pairs which
generate significant traffic are relevant submarkets." Thus, in the
American-Eastern Merger Case," the Department of Justice and the
CAB's Bureau of Economic Regulation took this position," and neither
American nor Eastern disputed them. As the examiner stated:
The most precisely definable geographic submarkets in the
air-transportation business are specific pairs of points or a
group of such city pairs. However, there are tens of thou-
sands of pairs of points in the domestic-air-transportation-
route system, some of which have no traffic at all and many
of which account for practically none. In 1961, the Board's
10-percent sample showed passengers traveling between
38,432 pairs of points. A large number of the total had only
one passenger during the year. A pair of points or group of
pairs of points becomes a relevant geographic submarket
only if found to be economically significant. (Emphasis
supplied.)"
This conclusion that significant city pairs constitute relevant sub-
markets seems eminently sound. It is consistent with the realities of
the industry, and it follows, as the examiner pointed out, from the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States." The
Supreme Court there recognized that submarkets are determined by
14 83 Cong. Rec. 6731-32 (1938).
15 United Air Lines Transp. Corp. & Western Air Express Corp.—Interchange
of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723, 733 (1940).
16 The elimination of competition in city pairs that do not generate much traffic
has twice been held not to violate the anti-monopoly proviso. Braniff-Mid-Continent
Merger Case, 15 CAB. 708 (1952); Continental Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323
(1955).
17 No. 13335, CAB. The Hearing Examiner recommended that the merger be not
approved. Following a report that the CAB had voted 3-2 against the merger, the agree-
ment was terminated and, upon motion of American Airlines, the proceeding was dis-
missed. Order No. E-19801, July 12, 1963.
15 Brief for United States, p. 6, Brief for the Bureau of Economic Regulation, p. 66,
American-Eastern Merger Case, supra note 17.
15 Recommended Decision of Ralph L. Wiser, Hearing Examiner, p. 7 (Nov. 27,
1962), American-Eastern Merger Case, No. 13335, CAB [hereinafter referred to as
Recommended Decision].
20 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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examining "such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of
the submarket as a separate economic entity ....s 21 The Court added:
Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the
definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic
one. The geographic market selected must, therefore, both
"correspond to the commercial realities" of the industry and
be economically significant. Thus, although the geographic
market in some instances may encompass the entire Nation,
under other circumstances it may be as small as a single
metropolitan area."
The conclusions of the examiner in the American-Eastern Merger
Case as to which city pairs were "economically significant" appear
to, and may, have been based on size alone, certainly a factor of
major importance. Two markets with yearly passenger totals of 18,130
and 13,530, the examiner concluded, were "not economically signifi-
cant for the purposes of the proviso." 23 He ruled that seven other
city pairs with passenger totals ranging from 61,040 to 950,350 were
"economically significant."24
An important and related factor that should be considered is
whether the public convenience and necessity requires competition
in the markets in question. A city pair which is not large enough to
require competitive service, would not seem to be "economically sig-
nificant", and it is hence not a relevant submarket.
Within a relevant market or submarket, the Board early made
clear that the term "monopoly" was to be read in conjunction with
the term "and thereby restrain competition". Therefore, "monopoly"
requires a degree of control which restrains competition. Thus, it
stated in the United-Western Interchange Case, 25
In modern usage, most of the definitions suggested by the
courts fall into two general categories, one of which defines
the term "monopoly" as embracing any combination the ten-
dency of which is to prevent competition in its broad and
general sense, and to control prices to the detriment of the
public, and the other holding that the word "monopoly"
means the control of a particular business or article of trade,
without regard to the results which may flow therefrom.
If the first definition of the word "monopoly", which is
21 Id. at 325.
22 Id. at 336-37.
23 Recommended Decision, supra note 19, at 8.
24 Id. at 12-13.
25 United Air Lines Transp. Corp. & Western Air Express Corp.—Interchange of
Equipment, 1 C,A.A. 723 (1940).
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essentially descriptive of a result, is applied to the proviso in
section 408(b), the words immediately following, "and there-
by restrain competition," would be repetitious and of no
effect since that definition by its terms includes the factor of
restraint of competition. On the other hand, if the second
definition, which treats "monopoly" as a condition embody-
ing a particular degree of control, is applied, the remaining
words of the proviso would have a definite meaning and
effect, since it would not be a foregone conclusion that such a
condition would restrain competition. It is a generally ac-
cepted rule of statutory construction that every word of a
statute is to be given meaning, for it cannot be assumed that
particular words were used without some purpose. It is con-
cluded, therefore, that the word "monopoly," as used in the
first proviso of section 408(b), refers to a particular degree
of control of air transportation, or any phase thereof, in any
territory or section of the country. It follows that restraint
of competition is a factor, insofar as the application of the
proviso is concerned, only if it results from that degree of
control which the Authority decides constitutes a monopoly
of air transportation?"
Construed alone, as "a particular degree of control," without regard
to its effect upon competition, the term "monopoly" is essentially
meaningless.
The question of what degree of control is objectionable is more
difficult. The examiner in the American-Eastern Merger Case ruled
that a ninety per cent participation in a market would ordinarily con-
stitute monopoly." This definition, the examiner noted, was adopted
for use by Gill and Bates," "after extensive discussion with leading
airline traffic and sales officials" because,
20 Id. at 733-34. The Board considered and rejected the argument that the term
"monopoly" refers to a situation where only one carrier is authorized to provide service
in a market. This argument was also made by American Airlines in the American-
Eastern Merger Case, supra note 17. See Brief for American Airlines, Inc., p. 35,
American-Eastern Merger Case, No. 13335, CAB. This cannot be the test since route
authorizations do not, and the Board cannot, compel air carriers to compete effec-
tively. The Board knows from wide experience that many authorized carriers do
not provide competitive service in particular markets, and it may take years for a
carrier to become a real factor even in a market in which it undertakes to provide
competitive service. The Chicago-Miami market is perhaps a good example. Northwest
Airlines was authorized to serve this large market in 1958 in the Great Lakes Southeast
Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 829 (1958). In 1962, Northwest's share of the market was less
than 10%, and its share had not exceeded 15% in any prior year. See CAB, Competition
Among Domestic Air Carriers, 1959-1962.
27 Recommended Decision, supra note 19, at 10-11. The 90% measure is used in
the CAB's annual studies of competition among domestic airlines and in Gill and Bates,
Airline Competition (1949).
28 Supra note 27.
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a 10-percent participation by a competitor was felt to be the
minimum participation necessary to constitute effective com-
petition from the standpoint of influencing a competitor's
service or rates under normal conditions.
The examiner also ruled that monopoly may be created with a
lesser degree of control 2D As suggested by the Department of Justice,"
he found the decisions of the courts "in respect of monopolies in other
businesses . . . helpful in appraising lesser-percentage situations
which also constitute monopoly.""
There is, of course, a threshold question of causation. Monopoly
would not seem to result from the unification if, independently of
the unification, one of the parties to it already has a monopoly in
the market. The monopoly in such a case would seem to result from the
response of the public to the service and promotional activities of the
party thereto who dominated the market independently of the unifica-
tion. Monopoly also does not result from the unification if one of the
parties thereto is about to go out of business. This is the teaching of
the United-Capital Merger Case." Thus, in various markets, including
four major markets (New York-Cleveland, Cleveland-Chicago, Phila-
delphia-Detroit and Philadelphia-Cleveland), United and Capital were
the only carriers authorized to provide service. As a result of the
merger, which was approved by the Board, only United was authorized
to provide service in these markets." The Board concluded that the
anti-monopoly proviso was inapplicable under the "failing business"
doctrine in view of the impending failure of Capital." The reviewing
court found it unnecessary "to fit this problem . . . into ready-made
doctrinaire styles or sizes; the matter is clear enough on the face of
the facts and the statute without intermediate measurements." 35 The
court concluded that the proviso was not violated simply because,
with the collapse of Capital, "the field would have been left to the
remaining operators" in any event, whereas,
29 Recommended Decision, supra note 19, at 12.
30 Brief for United States, pp. 6-8, American-Eastern Merger Case, No 13335, CAB.
31 Recommended Decision, supra note 19, at 11.
32 No. 11699, CAB, April 3, 1961 (Order No. E-16605), aff'd sub nom. Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
33 To its credit, the Board promptly instituted an investigation to determine whether
competition should be restored in the four major markets in which competition was
eliminated. United Competitive Service Investigation, Nos. 12837 et al., CAB, July 25,
1961 (Order No. E-17217). The Initial Decision of Herbert K. Bryan, Hearing Examiner,
May 31, 1963, finds need for competitive service in these four markets and he recom-
mends that it be provided by American between New York and Cleveland and by North-
west in the other markets.
31 United-Capital-Merger Case, No. 11699, CAB, April 3, 1961, Order No. E-16605,
at 3.
35 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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The merger brought a new and hearty competitor into the
area. Those already there had more competition and thus
less monopoly than they had theretofore had."
The question of what degree of control will restrain competition
and thereby result in monopoly should be approached flexibly, with
due regard for economic and competitive realities in the industry.
The ninety per cent measure used by the examiner in the American-
Eastern Merger Case is useful, but it should be applied with caution,
as should all mathematical tests. Market shares tend to be highly
volatile in the airline industry, and it would clearly be well to examine
them, when used, over a period of years."
A unification of air carriers would not seem to result in monopoly
if another carrier authorized to provide service in the market can be
expected to provide an effective competitive service. 38
 If there is
sufficient traffic in the market to warrant such service, there would
seem to be no reason why it, should not develop in normal circum-
stances unless the disparity between carriers is such as to discourage it.
Although the size of the American-Eastern colossus posed special
problems in this regard, the small trunklines have repeatedly demon-
strated their ability to compete with the "Big Four." As the Board
said in the New York-Florida Case: 89
It has been amply demonstrated that small carriers can com-
pete with larger ones, and that given access to markets of
adequate traffic density, sound route structure, and the exer-
cise of sound managerial judgment, over the long run, a small
carrier can obtain a fair share of the markets involved.'
Even in markets where the unified carrier would be the only
carrier remaining with authority to provide service, it is possible,
by new route awards, to preserve competition. In order to prevent
86 Id. at 401.
37 For example, the examiner found that the merger would create monopoly in the
Baltimore-New York, Chicago-Indianapolis, Hartford-New York, Louisville-New York
and New York-Providence markets, in which the merger partners carried 87% to 97%
of the traffic in 1960. Yet, by the fourth quarter of 1962, their share of the traffic, com-
pared to 1960, was as follows:
1960 1962 (4th qtr.)
Baltimore-New York 87% 41%
Chicago-Indianapolis 94 90
Hartford-New York 95 75
Louisville-New York 94 99
New York-Providence 97 88
CAB, Competition Among Domestic Air Carriers, 1960 and October 1-December 31, 1962.
38
 A carrier that has a 10% participation is, for this purpose, considered to be
providing an effective competitive service. See text accompanying notes 28 and 29 supra.
39 24 CA.B. 94 (1956).
40 Id. at 102.
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the elimination of competition in the interim, the Board could, by
exemption," permit another carrier to provide competitive service
pending a new route award.
It is possible that monopoly within the meaning of the statute
may also not result when; although monopoly is created in one or more
relevant submarkets and competition is thereby restrained there, on
the whole competition in air transportation is enhanced.' Congress
legislated a principle of competition in Section 102 of the Federal
Aviation Act," and a commitment to competition motivated the success-
ful effort to eliminate "unduly" from "unduly restrain competition." It
may well be argued that it is thus inconsistent to construe the proviso
as to preclude the Board from approving a unification of air carriers
which enhances competition in air transportation.
However, the contrary view—that the statute is violated when
monopoly is created and competition restrained in any economically
significant market—has much to commend it. This construction is
supported by the terms of the statute and also by the traditional usage
of the terms monopoly and restraint of competition. Furthermore,
Congress, by the deletion of the word "unduly" from "unduly restrain
competition" would seem to have sought to circumscribe the Board
and limit its discretion to approve unifications of air carriers. This
construction, it should be emphasized, does not preclude the Board
from approving the unification. The Board can prevent the creation of
monopoly, and consequent elimination of competition by new route
awards and measures to preserve competitive service in the interim."
THE PUBLIC INTEREST CRITERION
In cases where the anti-monopoly proviso is not violated, the
Board has the broad power to approve any unification of air carriers
which, in its judgment, is in the public interest.'
41 Federal Aviation Act § 416, 72 Stat. 771 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b)• (1958).
42 This view is expressed in Comment, Merger and Monopoly in Domestic Aviation,
supra note 12, at 878.
43 Federal Aviation Act § 102, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
44 See text accompanying note 41, supra.
42 By its terms, the statute requires approval of any merger unless, after hearing,
the Board determines that the unification "will not be consistent with the public
interest ...." Federal Aviation Act 408(b), 74 Stat. 901 (1960), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b)
(Supp. IV, 1959-62). In support of its application for approval of its merger with
Eastern, American sought to distinguish this mandate from the usual requirement of an
affirmative finding that a merger will be consistent with or promote the public interest.
Brief for American Airlines, p. 33, American-Eastern Merger Case, No. 13335, CAB.
Although the Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he negative in which this provision
is cast is to be noted" and that "it requires approval unless public interest prevents,"
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1962), there would
seem to be no essential difference. The Board has consistently taken the position that
these provisions "have essentially the same meaning," Acquisition of Marquette by TWA,
2 CAB. 1, 5 (1940) and;
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The Board's decisions give considerable guidance as to the role
played by the principle of competition as an element of the public
interest in unification cases. The Board has consistently approved, as
being in the public interest, unifications of the smaller trunklines.
In two early cases, it approved Western's acquisition of Inland Air
Lines, which combined two independent systems serving different
territories and different needs and having a single common point,"
and it approved Northeast's control of Mayflower, which was in bank-
ruptcy and inoperative, thereby joining together two regional carriers
in New England which served different areas with a common point at
Boston." The Board also approved the merger of Braniff and Mid-
Continent, thereby unifying two systems which complemented each
other geographically and creating new competitive and single-carrier
services.' Competition was eliminated in several small markets, in-
cluding Kansas City-Houston, which generated 457 passengers in
March 1950 and 434 passengers in September 1950. Improved service
was expected to result in these markets from the merger, however, and
overall, its benefits clearly outweighed whatever adverse effects might
be anticipated in these markets. Similarly, in the Delta-Chicago and
Southern Merger Case," the Board approved a merger of two contig-
uous systems with several common points. The merger would "aug-
ment competition" by enabling the surviving carrier "to compete
for traffic now moving over routings of other carriers. .. ."" Although
only the Delta-Chicago and Southern Merger Case was opposed, the
foregoing decisions indicate that the Board favors sound mergers of
small trunklines where the anti-monopoly proviso is not violated.
On the other hand, unifications involving Big Four carriers as
one of the parties to a proposed unification, have been disapproved
except where no anti-monopoly proviso violation existed and where
either the carrier to be absorbed was in extremis or had no hope of
achieving self-sufficiency.
In the first case to come before the Board involving a Big Four
under our interpretation of these sections, in accordance with well-established
rules of construction, the distinction between the affirmative and the negative
finding is an unimportant one for the purposes of this decision since the public
interest is the primary consideration of either of them.
Acquisition of Mayflower Airlines, Inc. By Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 680,
681 (1944). Although the difference in language may have some bearing on the burden
of proof or the burden of going forward with evidence, it is not likely that any carriers
proposing to integrate their systems would take any risks in this regard.
40 Western Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Inland Air Lines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 654
(1944).
47 Acquisition of Mayflower Airlines, Inc. By Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 680
(1944), supplemental opinion, 6 C.A.B. 139 (1944).
98 Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708 (1952).
90 Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952).
50 Id. at 685.
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carrier, the Board, in United Air Lines Trans p. corp.—Acquisition of
Western Air Express Corp G 1 found that the acquisition of Western by
United was not in the public interest. 52 Its decision in this regard,
which is approved by Professor Fulda, was contrary to the recom-
mendation of Dean Roscoe Pound, special trial examiner. Dean
Pound would have approved the acquisition because it would provide,
in competition with TWA, a new transcontinental service to Los
Angeles in place of an inconvenient connecting service via Salt Lake
City. In his view, the north-south services of United and Western
co-existed and were complementary; they were not really competitive,
and could not become so because forty per cent of Western's revenues
was derived from its link with United at Salt Lake City. The Board
however viewed the proposed acquisition in quite another light. Ap-
proval would, in the Board's view:
(1) significantly affect the competitive balance between the
three transcontinental carriers by giving United "direct transconti-
nental routes to all four major West coast metropolitan areas, whereas
no other air carrier has direct entry to more than two of such areas; " 3
(2) "extend United's control over western traffic, and its ad-
vantage with respect thereto, [over the other transcontinental carriers]
eastward to the Rocky Mountains," and thereby "adversely affect
the existing competitive opportunities for western business and .. .
greatly increase United's advantage with respect to such business'
and
(3) eliminate "some competition . . . for north and south busi-
ness" on the West Coast and "the only established route capable of
offering competition to United between the Los Angeles region and
points in the north such as Spokane, Wash., and between Salt Lake
City and the same northern points, including Seattle, Wash."' The
Board also noted that Western was "financially self-sufficient" and
"active and aggressive in the promotion of new business in the west,"
and it anticipated that it would "promote local service more aggres-
51 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940).
52 United was a transcontinental carrier and a north-south carrier on the West
Coast, Western's system extended from San Diego to Great Falls, Montana, via Los
Angeles and Salt Lake City.
53 United Air Lines Transp. Corp: Acquisition of Western Air Express Corp., supra
note 51, at 745. United already had routes to San Francisco, Portland, Oregon, and
Seattle and Spokane, Washington. TWA had routes to Los Angeles and San Francisco;
American had a route to Los Angeles.
54 Id. at 746. United, by virtue of its north-south West Coast service, already had
a significant advantage in competing for West Coast passengers.
55
 Id. at 747. United and Western were in direct competition between San Diego
and Los Angeles. Western also carried some passengers going to or from Seattle and
Spokane, although the only possible routings were by connection with United in Salt
Lake City or by connection with Northwest in Butte or Helena, Montana.
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sively than would a large transcontinental system!" 60 The Board con-
cluded that approval of the unification was not the "only means of
eliminating passenger inconvenience at Salt Lake City due to the
change of planes,"" and on the same day as it disapproved the acquisi-
tion, it approved an equipment interchange to do so. 58 In summary,
the Board stated that:
the act seeks a state of competition among air carriers to the
extent required by the sound development of the industry.
The maintenance of such a constructive competition, we
believe, will be best served at the present state of the indus-
try's development by a reasonably balanced system of air
transportation in every section of the country. . . . To allow
one air carrier to obtain control of air transportation in the
West coast area greatly in excess of that possessed by compet-
itors would, in our opinion, seriously endanger the develop-
ment of a properly balanced air-transportation system in this
region; and the elimination of the only independent north
and south air carrier west of the Rocky Mountains might be
expected to retard the promotion of air travel in this direc-
tion."
Similarly, the Board disapproved the proposed acquisition by
American of Mid-Continent, which was a north-south carrier with
routes extending from Minot, North Dakota, and Minneapolis-St.
Paul, Minnesota, on the north, to New Orleans on the south." In
Professor Fulda's view, this decision, which he approves, was "[m]ost
significant, from an antitrust point of view . . . ."°' The Board con-
cluded that the systems would not integrate well and that optimum
development of Mid-Continent's important connecting services would
be impeded. However, principally, it disapproved the acquisition be-
cause of the "size and competitive position" of American" and the
competitive effect of the proptel upon TWA and United as well as
Braniff and Delta. As the Boarc stated:
In the first place, it is part of the generally accepted business
concept of good will that the company serving the larger
number of customers to their satisfaction will on that ac-
66 Ibid.
67 Id. at 742.
68 United Air Lines Transp. Corp. & Western Air Express Corp.—Interchange of
Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723 (1940).
59 Id. at 750.
60
 American Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.,
7 C.A.B. 365 (1946).
61 Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries: Transportation 226 (1961).
62
 ArnericansAirlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.,
supra note 60, at 380.
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count enjoy a competitive advantage of soliciting patronage
for additional service. It is only human nature to elect a
service or commodity of known value rather than risk a
choice of the less familiar. In this respect American, through
the mere volume and geographical scope of its operations,
inevitably holds a position of some favor over its competitors
of more limited operation, and this is a competitive advan-
tage apart from that gained by virtue of greater expendi-
tures for advertising and promotion and the various luxuries
and extra services which, generally speaking, can be afforded
only by the larger organizations.
In the second place, the wider the geographical scope of a
carrier's operations in comparison with a particular rival, the
greater the competitive advantage which it will enjoy through
its control of traffic originating at or destined to points to
which the other carrier does not have access. Because of
this fact, the extension of a carrier's system may enable it to
divert a substantial amount of traffic from a competing car-
rier without at the same time rendering a service more at-
tuned to the public convenience and necessity.
• ' •
In the light of these considerations, the facts of record re-
quire us to find that the acquisition of control of Mid-
Continent by American must reasonably be expected to pro-
duce so great a diversion of traffic from other air carriers
as would be inconsistent with sound economic conditions in
air transportation and would impair the competition we deem
requisite to assure the development and maintenance of an
adequate air transportation system. In this respect, there-
fore, the transaction proposed would transgress against two
of the important principles of policy incorporated in the
over-all standard of public interest."
Approximately seven and one-half years later, the Board ap-
proved for the first time a significant acquisition by a Big Four
carrier—the acquisition of Colonial by Eastern." The unification of
these systems was held to be in the public interest for a variety of
reasons. Colonial's future as an independent entity was deemed hope-
less. Since its system was characterized by short, multi-stop flights,
unusual scheduling difficulties, bad weather and poor utilization of
63 Id. at 378-79.
64 Eastern-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 453; 18 C.A.B. 781 (1954);
23 C.A.B. 500 (1956). TWA had previously been permitted to acquire Marquette Air-
lines, a very small carrier with a route of only 566 miles. Acquisition of Marquette
Airlines, Inc. By TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1 (1940).
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personnel and equipment, its unit costs were high, and it had "achieved
but little progress toward economic self-sufficiency."" As the Board
stated:
The record is clear that Colonial's existing route system fails
to afford it either now or for the foreseeable future a reason-
able opportunity to enjoy profitable operations at competitive
fares without considerable government support through mail
pay."
There was no "immediate prospect" of solving "Colonial's difficulties"
by route awards, which "would involve a considerable investment in
duplicate facilities with attendant costs to be written off," and per-
haps excessive competition and disruption of the operations of other
carriers." There was "substantial advantage to the public" by way of
improved and new single carrier services. The systems were well inte-
grated, making possible improved "personnel utilization" and "aircraft
scheduling?"°e The acquisition gave Eastern a real advantage over
National in the competition for traffic between upstate New York and
Florida, but the anticipated diversion of revenues from National was
estimated to be only $68,000 a year. Although Professor Fulda dis-
approves of this decision, which he regards as having "serious anti-
trust implications" and "inconsistent with the principles set forth in
the American-Mid-Continent case,"" there seems to your writers to be
an important difference of degree in view of the substantial advantages
of the merger. The advantages of the Eastern-Colonial unification
are obscured somewhat by the Board's comparative consideration
of a National-Colonial unification, which Professor Fulda thought was
inadequate, but since no such unification appears ever to have been
proposed, this would seem to have been of no practical moment.
Finally, the Board approved the merger of United and Capital."
It did so simply because there was no "practical alternative.. . . Capi-
tal is financially in extremis and will not survive if the merger is
disapproved." The Board fully recognized "the manifest implications
of the merger in terms of maintaining a balanced route structure,"
but ". . . the public interest in preventing a collapse of the Capital
system outweighs whatever disadvantages may inhere in the merger." 7 '
Although this decision too is disapproved by Professor Fulda in view
of its impact upon competition, the Board's analysis is persuasive.
65 Eastern-National-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 781, 785 (1954).
66 Id. at 784.
67 Id. at 785.
68 Id. at 782, 784.
69 Fulda, op. cit. supra note 61, at 228.
70 United-Capital Merger Case, supra note 32.
71 United-Capital Merger Case, supra note 34, at 2.
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Perhaps the Board was bluffed by United's insistence upon "all or
nothing," but no other meaningful alternative seems to have been pro-
posed, and the risk of "calling the bluff" was great. Professor Fulda
favored the view of Member Minetti,' who would have conditioned
approval of the merger "upon immediate institution of an investigation
to determine whether Capital's authority to serve major points . .
should be altered, suspended or transferred to a carrier other than
United.' Member Minetti thought that rejection by United was
unlikely, but he was prepared to risk such rejection in view of the
competitive impact of the merger. In the event of rejection, the Board
could, in his judgment, "take effective action to prevent Capital's
failure while the carrier is being reorganized into a profitable economic
unit?"'
Although approval of the United-Capital merger contravenes
well established concepts of "balanced route structure," it is clear
that this does not mark a policy change by the Board and that the
requirement of "competitive balance" will continue to be an important
factor in future cases. The circumstances of the United-Capital mer-
ger were unique, and there seems no reason to expect the Board again
to depart from its policy of "competitive balance" except in the most
extreme circumstances. Pursuant to the policy of "competitive bal-
ance," the Board has repeatedly made route awards to the smaller
trunklines and reaffirmed a policy to reduce the disparity in size and
strength between the Big Four and the remainder of the trunklines.
Thus the Board stated in the Southwest-Northeast Service Case,"
As we pointed out in the New York-Chicago Service Case
the statutory objective of a sound national air route structure
requires, in the selection of a carrier to provide needed new
services, consideration of the applicants' competitive posi-
tions and their relative need for strengthening. It is vital, in
our opinion, to so develop the national air route structure
as to tend to decrease rather than increase the gap between
the relative size of the Big Four carriers and the smaller
trunks.
We cannot ignore the fact that substantial route awards
to the larger carriers would tend to create a greater un-
balance in carrier size, and thereby adversely affect the
ability of the smaller trunks to compete effectively in markets
which they jointly serve with the larger carriers. We believe
72 Fulda, op. cit. supra note 61, at 229.
73 United-Capital Merger Case, supra note 34, opinion of Member Minetti at I.
74 Id. at 10.
73 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955).
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that the benefits to be derived from effective competition will
be spread to a greater number of cities if the size disparity
between the smaller and larger carriers is reduced. In many
markets which are jointly served today by a small trunk and
a Big Four carrier, there is no effective competitive service
because the smaller carriers' resources and route systems
inhibit them from challenging their larger competitors. To
the extent that we choose a small trunk instead of a Big Four
carrier to provide a needed new service in high-density mar-
kets, we enlarge the small carrier's opportunity to render
effective competitive service in other markets which they are
already authorized to serve."
Pursuant to this policy, the Board has often declined to make route
awards to Big Four carriers, or done so with the greatest of reluctance
because of compelling service needs." Similarly; the Board has sought
to maintain "competitive balance" among the Big Four itself."
The Board's emphasis on the desirability of competition would
also seem to foreshadow skepticism of integrations which will signifi-
cantly reduce competition. In route cases, the Board has repeatedly
emphasized the desirability of competition in air transportation. As
the Board stated in the Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case,"
The Board in the past has recognized the benefits which
accrue to the public from stiff multicarrier competition in
major traffic markets in the form of improved quality and
quantity of service, increased coach service, utilization of
the most modern equipment, etc.
. . . .
It has been suggested that more than enough seats are now
available to accommodate all travelers, and that therefore
an additional carrier in the market is not needed. This is a
familiar argument that has been advanced virtually every
time a competing authorization has been sought. Undoubt-
edly, the threat of additional competition may cause car-
riers temporarily to improve service in particular markets;
but the authorization of additional competition insures the
76 Id. at 56-57. See also, e.g., Southern Transcontinental Service Case, Nos. 7984
et al., CAB, 1961 Order No. E-16500, at 21, 37-43, 53-58; Great Lakes—Southeast
Service Case, 27 CAB. 829, 850, 862 (1958); New York-Florida Case, 24 CA.B. 94, 99,
113 (1956); Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 CAB. 52, 56-58, 64, 75 (1955);
New York-Chicago Service Case, 22 CAS. 973, 979-80, 985, 988 (1955); Denver Service
Case, 22 CAB. 1178, 1187-88 (1955).
77 Southern Transcontinental Service Case, supra note 76; Southwest-Northeast
Service Case, supra note 76; Denver Service Case, supra note 76.
78 Southern Transcontinental Service Case, supra note 76.
79 27 C.A.B. 829 (1958).
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continued provision of a fully competitive service: From a
regulatory point of view, we are convinced that the division
of a major traffic market among a number of carriers suffi-
cient to insure a lively competition will result in the con-
tinued provision of the greater number of benefits to the
traveling public. The Board has long followed this policy,
and we see no sound reason to depart therefrom. 8°
Faithful to this principle, the Board, in a series of important route
awards stretching over a decade, has authorized additional services
in major traffic markets throughout the country."' In these decisions,
the Board has been influenced, in accordance with its statu-
tory mandate, by the concept that competitive service holds
the greatest prospect for vigorous development of our na-
tional air transport system with the fullest improvements in
service and technological developments.'
This concept should also have an important influence in unification
cases.
In view of the prohibition in Section 7 of the Clayton Act of
acquisitions the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen com-
petition,' the expectation that the Board would not look with favor
upon unifications which significantly reduce competition would seem
to be supported by the Board's statement in the Local Cartage Agree-
ment Case" that:
Where an agreement has among its significant aspects ele-
ments which are plainly repugnant to established antitrust
principles, approval should not be granted unless there is a
clear showing that the agreement is required by a serious
transportation need, or in order to secure important public
benefits"'
Although this approach was not mandatory on the Board under the
Supreme Court's decision in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,"
as it would have been under the minority opinion, it seems clear that
88 Id. at 853-54.
81 E.g., Pacific Southwest Local Service Case, January 23, 1962, Order No. E-17950;
Southern Transcontinental Service Case, supra note 76, at 21, 37-43, 53-58; New York-
San Francisco Nonstop Service Case, September 2, 1959, Order No. E-14412; Great
Lakes-Southeast Service Case, supra note 79; Southwest-Northeast Service Case, supra
note 76; New York-Chicago Service Case, supra note 76; Denver Service Case, supra
note 76.
82 Southwest-Northeast Service Case, supra note 76, at 60.
83 Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
84 15 CAB. 850 (1952).
85 Id. at 853.
86 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
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it is a sound approach. It is true that pursuant to McLean Trucking,
acquisitions governed by the Interstate Commerce Act are not to be
measured by the standards of the antitrust laws. The policy of these
laws is, however, a factor to be considered. This would seem even
clearer under the Federal Aviation Act than it is under the Interstate
Commerce Act in view of the unique declaration in the former favoring
"[c]ompetition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develop-
ment of an air-transportation system . . . .""
A cautionary note should be injected with regard to the Board's
continuing commitment to the principle of competition in air trans-
portation. The Board has recently refused to renew the authority of
Northeast Airlines to operate between the northeast and Florida."
This decision is completely inconsistent with established Board policy
with regard to competition. In the original New York-Florida Case,"
the Board stated that:
[A] s we have on a number of occasions pointed out, the Con-
gress in adopting the Civil Aeronautics Act, clearly con-
sidered competition to hold the greatest prospect for vigorous
development of our national air route system "with the
fullest improvements in service and technological develop-
ments."°°
The markets involved, the Board said, "are in material respects more
than comparable to those for which in recent cases we have authorized
service by more than two carriers,"" and the Board concluded that
It would not be consistent with our statutory obligations
under the Act and the course of our decisions thereunder,
to merely maintain the status quo, and rely upon the carriers'
assurances as to their willingness and ability to remedy the
situation."'
The Board's decision that three carriers are not needed in one of
the largest travel markets in the world cannot be reconciled with the
Board's prior pronouncements as to its "statutory obligations under
the Act" and the policy of "the Congress in adopting the Civil Aero-
nautics Act" with regard to competition. The Board's new attitude
with regard to competition, if lawful, should be reflected in unification
cases, as well as in route cases.
87 Federal Aviation Act § 102, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958).
88 New York-Florida Renewal Case, Nos. 12285 et al., CAB, August 15, 1963,
Order No. E-19910, petitions for reconsideration denied, October 8, 1963, Order
No. E-20073.
88 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956).
99 Id. at 99.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
Although it is impossible to be doctrinaire about the role of com-
petition in connection with proposed unifications of air carriers, a few
generalizations are possible. The Board is likely to continue to be
receptive to sound unifications of small trunklines, which normally
augment, rather than diminish, competition. Unifications among the
Big Four are not likely to be tolerated. Any such arrangement would
be inconsistent with the Board's policy of competitive balance, and,
absent protective action by the Board, would inevitably involve an
intolerable lessening of competition.
Finally, the Board can be expected to approve the unification
of a Big Four carrier with a small trunkline if the small trunkline is
in serious difficulty or has no hope of achieving self-sufficiency.
However, except in such circumstances, such a unification is not
likely to be approved at least if it (1) upsets "competitive balance,"
(2) significantly lessens competition or (3) diverts substantial reve-
nues from another small trunkline that the Board feels should be
strengthened or protected. Measured against this principle, the Board's
actions with regard to the United-Western, American-Mid-Continent,
Eastern-Colonial and United-Capital unifications are consistent and
sensible, and they afford excellent guideposts for future Board actions
in this area.
Each case will, in the last analysis, depend largely on its particu-
lar facts. As the Board stated in the American-Mid-Continent Merger
Case's:
The ultimate question to be decided in this proceeding is
whether the proposed acquisition of control is not consistent
with the public interest. Adjudication of this issue is a bal-
ancing process. No single factor is controlling; rather, we
must weigh all the considerations disclosed by the evidence
relating to the high purposes enumerated in section 2 of the
Act, in order to calculate, as near as may be determined, the
probable net effect of the proposed transaction upon the
public interest."
98 American Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.,
7 C.A.B. 365 (1946).
94 Id. at 372.
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